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The momentum anomaly has been widely documented in the literature. However, there 
are still many issues where there is no consensus and puzzles left unexplained. One is 
that strategies based on momentum present a level of risk that is inconsistent with the 
diversification that it offers. Moreover, recent studies indicate that this risk is variable 
over time and mostly strategy-specific. This work project hypothesises and proves that 
this evidence is explained by the portfolio constitution of the momentum strategy over 
time, namely the covariance and correlation between companies in the top and down 




Keywords: Momentum, Correlations, Strategy-specific risk, Time-varying risk 
 
 2 
1. General Overview: 
1.1: Introduction: 
The Momentum anomaly has been recurring in asset returns. Strategies based on the 
idea that recent winners outperform recent losers have provided high returns. But they 
have come alongside with inconsistent levels of risk. 
The evidence on momentum was found for the first time by Levy (1967). In his 
findings, the best group had 9.6% 6-month average return while the worse only 
averaged 2.9%. But it was only Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) who properly scrutinized 
it, finding a 12.01% average annual return for their prime portfolio of winners minus 
losers. Over the last two decades momentum has been the focus of numerous studies 
and has been discovered in different asset classes (Antonacci (2013)) and geographic 
regions (Griffin, Ji and Martin (2003)). 
However, the big subject around momentum is the economic puzzles that it 
encompasses. The first concerns its abnormal returns, represented by its large alpha. 
This means that, as pointed out in Fama and French (1996), momentum excess returns 
cannot be explained by its relation with the market excess return or even by a 
multifactor model such as the Fama-French three-factors model. Studies about this 
puzzle, such as Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), have been repeatedly documented, 
debating possible explanations that cover data mining, behavioural biases and 
compensation for risk. 
Nonetheless, the second, regarding its risk, presents an even bigger puzzle. The first 
issue comes from the non-normal distribution of returns (high kurtosis and negative 
skew), which carries a lot of crash risk, as pointed out by Grundy and Martin (2001). 
The second is that momentum bears a level of risk that is too high for the diversification 
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that it brings (Barroso and Santa-Clara (2012)). Finally, the risk has a time-varying 
effect and is very predictable, as studied by Daniel and Moskowitz (2012). 
 
1.2: Literature review: 
As pointed in the previous sub-section, momentum risk features the most interesting 
and less covered puzzle. The first relevant study about this subject is that of Grundy and 
Martin (2001). They identified market risk to be the main source of momentum risk and 
its predictability, since momentum had negative betas after bear markets and positive 
betas after bull markets. One decade later, Daniel and Moskowitz (2012) contested the 
previous model of linear betas and developed a new one based on the high-frequency 
beta of daily returns. Nevertheless, the direction of their thoughts and findings was the 
same. 
More recently, Barroso (2013) added to the defence of market-driven risk as the source 
of momentum risk behaviour his bottom-up beta of momentum. He found that this 
weighted average beta of individual betas of stocks in the portfolio explained 39.59% of 
momentum risk. He also found that a high beta with respect to the market forecasts both 
lower returns and higher risk in the future, with a stronger effect on the second. 
However, none of these authors were able to avoid momentum crashes. This leads to the 
possibility that only by hedging the other component of risk, the specific risk1, might be 
possible to hedge against downward situations. 
The study of this specific component of momentum is well covered in Kang and Li 
(2007), where it is considered the third source of return predictability and the biggest 
                                                        
1 Specific risk here is not the result of low diversification in the portfolio but a consequence of 
the big component of momentum risk that cannot be explained by changes in market risk, thus 
being strategy-specific. 
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part of momentum profits. Nevertheless, the application of strategy-specific risk to 
explain momentum risk was only definitely proposed by Santa-Clara and Barroso 
(2012). They attributed to this component the major influence on their three major 
findings on momentum risk: high magnitude (too much risk despite the high Sharpe 
ratio: 15.03% average volatility for momentum compared to 12.81% for the market); 
variation over time (time-varying effect supported by a 12.26% standard deviation of 
realized volatility against only 7.82% for the market portfolio); and persistency. 
 
1.3. Purpose of the Project: 
This project will embark on the study of momentum, following the more recent and less 
covered findings and presenting previously unseen results. Therefore, the bottom line is 
the momentum risk puzzle and the course of action regards its specific component. 
To start, the most interesting findings in Barroso and Santa-Clara (2012) will be 
confirmed and replicated, namely those regarding the magnitude and time-variation of 
momentum risk, as well as the influence of strategy-specific risk in these. Then, these 
findings will be explained following the hypothesis that the drivers of specific risk are 
the correlations between the stocks of companies present in the long and short deciles. 
Correlations that will be assessed for stock residuals instead of returns because only the 
specific component is under analysis. 
The rational for this approach is that correlations, through covariance, are the only 
component of specific risk that explains the low diversification of momentum when the 
number of stocks is sizable enough for it to be high. For this to be true, periods of 
higher risk are expected to correspond to periods in which stocks of companies included 
in the long side are correlated among them, the ones in the short side are correlated 
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among them, and companies in opposite deciles are not correlated or are negatively 
correlated between them. If this is the case, the relation between stocks included in the 
portfolio justifies the risk at a certain period. Moreover, by separating the effect of 
correlations among winners, losers and between them it will be possible to assess which 
contributes the most for the magnitude and variation of momentum risk over time. 
This project will also contribute to two additional subjects. The first regards the source 
of correlations, which is studied by comparing the results obtained using residuals based 
on the Capital Asset Pricing Model with those obtained with the Fama-French Three-
factor Model. The hypothesis is that divergent results indicate a size and book-to-market 
effect on the correlations while similar results leave the explanation to other 
undetermined sources. The second concerns the debate around the behavioural/rational 
explanation of momentum risk, which is examined by calculating the correlations not 
only ex ante but also ex post, to see where the effect comes from. The thesis is that a 
rational risk-based explanation will provide a good justification if correlations were 
always present and are driving the risk; while a behavioural one better suits in the case 
that correlations are triggered when companies enter the strategy and experience the 




This work project uses the same monthly data as in Barroso (2013), taken from the 
Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and corresponding to all listed stocks in 
the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ from January 1950 until December 2010. In total, 
22.998 companies were considered in the sample. Individual monthly data for each 
security was taken regarding stock prices and gross dividend returns. 
Furthermore, monthly data for the Fama-French Three-Factor Model (market risk 
premium (RMRF), small minus big factor (SMB) and high minus low factor (HML)) 
were taken from Kenneth French’s data library, comprising monthly data from January 
1950 to December 2010. 
 
2.2. The Momentum Strategy and its Risk: 
The strategy used to capture the momentum effect follows a relative strength 
methodology that selects stocks based on their returns over a certain number of months 
and holds them for another pre-determined period.  
Following the same approach in Daniel and Moskowitz (2012) and Barroso and Santa-
Clara (2012), in every month t, cumulative returns1 from t-12 to t-2 were used to rank 
stocks2 into ten groups3. The momentum portfolio was constructed by buying the best 
performing group and selling short the worse performing one. These positions were 
maintained during the 1-month holding period considered. As most literature suggests, 
it was kept a 1-month gap between the end of the ranking period (t-12 to t-2) and the 
beginning of the holding period (t), in order to avoid spurious results from the short-
                                                        
2 Only stocks with valid returns from t-12 to t-2 and at t were considered. 
3 The division is managed such that the top and bottom deciles have exactly the same number of stocks. 
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term reversal effect usually observed in stock returns. Finally, regarding the weighting 
of stocks in the active deciles, equal weights were preferred over value weights, to 
avoid an erroneous size effect in the results. 
Momentum produces superior cumulative returns when compared to the portfolios built 
based on each Fama-French factor, as depicted in Figure 1. An investor who had chosen 
the momentum strategy in early 1956 would achieve a total 519.81% cumulative return 
after 60 years, while a similar investment on the market portfolio would only give a 
cumulative result of 404.16%. Moreover, Table 1 indicates that the momentum average 
return of 9.70% is above the 7.05% for the market risk factor. The Sharpe ratio, 
however, is slightly below of that of the market, but one needs to remember that 
momentum offers this for a zero investment endowment. These results are in line with 
the aforementioned literature supporting momentum, and differ from the 12.30% 
average annual return found in the Kenneth French Data Library for the same period of 
time due to the data selection process. 
Regarding risk, momentum presents a volatility level that is much higher than that of 
the market portfolio (21.68% against 15.03%, respectively). Furthermore, the high 
excess kurtosis (20.34) and the pronounced negative skew (-2.35) indicate that returns 
are far from normal. These results support the existence of a magnitude issue in 
momentum, as pointed out by Barroso and Santa-Clara (2012), and are very close to the 
20.38% average yearly volatility found in the Kenneth French Data Library for the 
period analysed. 
To confirm the time-varying effect of momentum, the monthly realized volatility of the 
WML portfolio and the Fama-French factors was performed looking back 60 months 







     (1) 
where i stands for each factor and t for each point in time. 
Figure 2 shows that there are three interesting periods in terms of volatility: 1975, 2000 
and 2008. In all, the realized volatility of momentum experience spikes, which coincide 
with periods in which the cumulative returns increase, suffer considerable changes and 
decrease afterwards. For the periods around years 2000 and 2008 the market premium 
factor also undergo similar (but in lower magnitude) volatility behaviour, thus 
explaining some of the variation, as the dot-com bubble and the 2008 crisis coincide 
with these dates, respectively. For the period of 1975, it seams that the source of extra 
volatility is solely specific to momentum. 
For the full sample, momentum volatility is stronger and varies more over time than that 
of the Fama-French factors. Regarding the first finding, the mean realized volatility is 
18.91% for momentum, compared to the 14.67% for the market premium. In what 
concerns the second, the volatility of risk is 8.58% for the WML portfolio while the 
RMRF portfolio’s standard deviation of risk was only 2.71% during the period 
considered. These results go in line with Barroso and Santa-Clara (2012), despite the 
differences in magnitude coming from the historic period considered. 
Thus, the intriguing results in Barroso and Santa-Clara (2012) are proven to exist in the 
sample and period chosen for this work project, which asks for a more detailed analysis 






2.3. Risk Analysis: 
2.3.1. Decomposition of Momentum Risk: Market vs. Specific Components: 
As aforementioned, total returns from momentum include both a market component 
(RMRF) and a specific component: 
𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑡−1𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑟𝑓𝑡 + 𝜀𝑚𝑜𝑚𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑀𝑡    (2) 
 
When the analysis is done at an individual level as in this paper, the decomposition can 
be expressed in the following way: 
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑡𝛽𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑟𝑓𝑡 + ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑡𝜀𝑖𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑀𝑡    (3) 
where i stands for each company in the portfolio. 







2      (4) 
 
The market component equals the squared standardized linear beta from a regression of 
momentum returns on the market excess return4 times the variance of the RMRF factor. 
The individual component is then obtained from the difference between total and 
market-driven risk. 
The results in Table 2 go in line with Barroso and Santa-Clara (2012). The market risk 
component only covers a small part of momentum total risk (5.77%, on average), 
leaving to the specific component the major part of its magnitude (94,23%, on average). 
Furthermore, the average annual specific risk is 18.44%, very close to the total risk, 
while the market component is only on average 3.17%, annualized. Regarding the 
variability over time, the volatility is also very similar for total and specific risk (8.58% 
and 8.56%, respectively, compared to the 2.76% of market-driven volatility). The small 
                                                        
4 Other more advanced models such as the Bottom-Up approach of Barroso (2013) were 
disregarded because already include a source of specificity by calculating the beta stock by 
stock. 
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influence of market risk is consistent over time, with the specific component following 
a similar behaviour as total risk, with spikes in the same periods. 
Thus, the results confirm the hypothesis that specific risk corresponds to the major 
component of momentum risk both in magnitude and time variation. So, it deserves an 
even deeper evaluation, to extract what drives this source of risk. 
 
2.3.2. Decomposition of Specific Risk: Variance vs. Covariance Components: 
In order to properly study the strategy-specific risk, it was decomposed into its two 
components: variance of each stock and covariance between every two stocks. To better 
understand the covariance component and its real source, this part is further split into 
three: covariance among winners, covariance among losers and covariance between 
stocks in separate deciles, in the following way: 
𝜎2(∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑡𝜀𝑖𝑡) = ∑ 𝑤
2
𝑖𝑖 𝜎
2(𝜀𝑖) + 2 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑤𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑖𝑊𝑊, 𝜀𝑗𝑊𝑊) + 2 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑤𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑖𝐿𝐿 , 𝜀𝑗𝐿𝐿) −𝑖≠𝑗𝑖≠𝑗
−2 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑤𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑖𝑊𝑊 , 𝜀𝑗𝐿𝐿)𝑖≠𝑗          (5) 
where i and j stand for different companies in the portfolio; WW is used when the 
company is in the winner’s decile and LL when it is in the loser’s decile. 
Each component was calculated having in mind that individual stocks have equal 
weights on the momentum portfolio. For stocks in which the strategy is long a positive 
weight was assigned while those in the short side took negative positions. 
These variances and covariances were calculated from the residuals of individual 
companies included in the strategy. This is done because looking at individual residuals 
instead of returns allows studying more directly the strategy-specific risk. It opens the 
door to the scrutiny of the interactions between stocks that are in the strategy on each 
decile while avoiding the effect of the common market component, which tends to 
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overstate these correlations. So, the residuals for each company at every point in time 
are obtained from a regression of individual gross dividend returns5 on the market risk-
premium. 
Table 3 resumes the most important statistics of the decomposition of specific risk. As 
observable, the covariance part is the most significant. Together, covariances account 
for 97.82% of momentum specific risk against only 2.18% of variances. This confirms 
what is expected from the formula, meaning that the high specific risk comes from the 
interaction between stocks. 
However, more important is to understand which covariance drives more of the specific 
risk. The weights of 67.81% for winner’s intra covariance component and 58.57% for 
loser’s intra covariance component are the most significant. The inter covariance has a 
negative weight of 28.57% because of the positions (one negative – loser –, and one 
positive – winner). The average value of the covariance over time is also higher for the 
intra covariance (12.41% and 10.90%, respectively for winners and losers) than for the 
cross covariance (6.18%). However, despite that intra deciles covariance are behaving 
as expected, the inter group covariance is actually contributing to a decrease in total 
specific risk, contrarily to the initial hypothesis. Thus, it is safe to conclude that it is the 
average covariance present among winners and among losers that contribute to such 
high strategy-specific risk and thus an abnormally high momentum risk. Nevertheless, 
the higher contribution of the winner’s side compared to the loser’s side is not 
significant to consider that the former has consistently a higher influence. 
Regarding the time-varying risk of momentum, the standard deviations of each 
component of specific risk indicate that the covariance part is the main responsible for 
                                                        
5 Since momentum is a zero-investment portfolio, there is no need to correct using the risk-free. 
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it. While the variance component has an annual standard deviation over time of 0.52%, 
the covariance components have standard deviations of 5.83%, 4.18% and 6.18%, 
respectively for winners, losers and between them. Thus, there evidence that the 
covariance is also the most important component of time-varying risk, despite that there 
is not a group that significantly contributes more for the full sample. 
Having a look at Figure 3, the periods of 1975, 2000 and 2008 are relevant again. In the 
first, the volatility of the winner’s covariance component contributes most to the 
volatility peak. In 2000 and 2008 both the winners and the cross covariance components 
contribute to this period of highest volatility. Overall, it is clear that the covariance 
among winners and between groups are the ones that varies more side by side with total 
risk, especially in the critical periods. The other covariance component seams to vary 
more randomly and thus contribute much less in terms of time-variation of risk. 
The results in this sub-section prove that the driver of specific risk, both in magnitude 
and variation is the covariance part, in line with the thesis proposed for this work 
project. However, despite that the long side shows signs of bigger influence, there is no 
conclusive evidence on which side is stronger. 
 
2.3.3. Analysis of Covariance through Correlation: 
Since covariance is the most important component of momentum specific risk, it is 
important to add to the analysis what drives this covariance. By definition, the 
covariance and correlation between two stocks i and j are intrinsically connected: 
    𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝜎𝑖𝜎𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑖, 𝑗)    (6) 
 
However, the former is affected by the individual volatility of each stock while the 
second is not. For this reason, to better understand the relation between stocks in the 
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momentum strategy, each residual’s covariance was studied through its corresponding 
correlation component regarding two further issues. The first was to compare the 
residuals obtained from the CAPM with a series of residuals obtained by the same 
process but using the Fama-French 3-Factor Model (FF). The usage of this latter model 
allows removing the size and book-to-market effects from the specific component of 
returns. The second was to calculate also ex post correlations, based on the 12 monthly 
residuals after the holding period. The difference between the ex ante and ex post 
correlations allows understanding whether correlations already existed or if they only 
appear or become stronger after being included in the strategy. 
Regarding the comparison between CAPM residuals and Fama-French residuals, Table 
4 compacts the statistical information regarding the six series of correlations for 
winners, losers and between them, for both models. The results presented go in line 
with the hypothesis made. Regarding the CAPM residuals, the average past correlation 
is clearly positive for the winner’s and loser’s deciles (10.37% and 9.81%, respectively) 
while for the cross deciles correlation is close to zero. In what concerns the FF 
residuals, correlations are, in general, lower. The negative average past cross correlation 
of -3.49% indicate that this component is forcing the risk to increase, in line with the 
intra group correlations. 
The number of periods with positive correlations confirm the robustness of the previous 
results, with 100% of them with positive average correlations intra deciles and 
significantly below between deciles (57.73% and 0.15% for CAPM and Fama-French, 
respectively). Moreover, all average correlations are significantly different from 0 at a 
one-tailed 5% significance level and the magnitudes are enough to consider them to be 
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economically significant. Thus, this should be an issue to consider in the analysis of 
momentum risk. 
The evidence that CAPM and Fama-French residuals behave similarly show that the 
inclusion of a size and market-to-book components does not change the behaviour of 
the specific component of companies’ returns in the momentum strategy. Nevertheless, 
the fact that the first are significantly higher that the second may indicate that part of the 
magnitude, of momentum residual correlations can be explained by one or both of these 
factors, but a part remain present from another possible source. 
Figure 4 allows evaluating the long-run evidence on average correlations. Despite that 
there is no clear path on correlations over time, the winners decile for CAPM have two 
volatility spikes around 1975 and 2000. While in 1975 it is accompanied by positive 
cross correlations, in 2000, it is sided with a negative spike of cross correlations. The FF 
residuals suffer much less fluctuations, with only slight spikes, such as 1982 for loser’s 
decile and 2000 for winner’s decile. These results indicate that while in 1975 the peak 
seem to come from the size or book-to-market factors; in 2000, corresponding to the 
dot-com bubble, the similarity in the behaviour of both residuals indicate that is the 
market factor that is driving these correlations. These observations are consistent with 
the spikes of total momentum volatility and so denote an important explanation for its 
occurrence. 
From a time-varying point of view, Table 4 shows that for CAPM residuals the 
correlations among winners have a stronger standard deviation (4.57%, monthly) than 
the other two groups (bellow 3%, monthly). However, the FF residuals’ correlations do 
not vary significantly more for any group (if something is the loser’s decile that varies 
slightly more that the other). Figure 5 indicates that the three series of correlations 
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suffered turbulent periods around 1975, 2000 and 2008, especially for the CAPM 
residuals but also for the Fama-French series, in line with what was found for total 
momentum risk, so proving that the volatility in correlations are driving momentum risk 
in crash periods. 
In what concerns the comparison between ex ante and ex post correlations, Table 5 
represent the descriptive statistics for the differences between the two. Contrarily to the 
behavioural view, there is no clear path indicating that companies become more 
correlated once they are added to the strategy. If something, it is the opposite case, with 
average differences (1 year minus 5 years) being negative among deciles (-5.20 
percentage points and -1.46 percentage points for winners and losers, respectively, with 
residuals from CAPM). It is only the cross correlation that increases, by 3.09 percentage 
points, on average, which also goes against the behavioural approach. These findings, 
which are significant at 5% confidence level, mean that when companies are included in 
the same decile the correlations among them decrease, on average, while their 
correlations increase when they are selected to opposite deciles. Thus, correlations were 
already present with the expected signals before the holding period, and move to the 
opposite direction when included in the strategy. 
The number of positive correlations confirms the aforementioned results in magnitude 
(10.03% and 29.48% for the in decile correlations and 84.10%% for the cross decile 
correlations). 
Regarding the Fama-French residuals, a similar evolution is registered, with a decrease 
of 3.70 and 2.18 percentage points, for winners and losers, and an increase of 3.54 
percentage points between groups. 
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In Figure 6, the evolution of these differences over time allows to draw some 
conclusions. Once again, the years of 1975 and 2000 are critical periods. In the first, the 
correlations among winners decrease drastically, while losers become more correlated 
among them. In the second, losers have a drastic increase in correlations from past to 
future, followed by a strong reversion. Regarding the inter correlations there is no 
specific period worth to mention, as fluctuations are relatively constant over time, but 
the lowest difference occur right after 1975. These findings indicate that the periods of 
higher total volatility also correspond to periods in which there are changes in the 
correlations among stocks, reinforcing that these changes are mainly a result of changes 
in existing correlations. 
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3. Conclusion: 
This work project studied and revealed new interesting results regarding the momentum 
risk puzzle that compose a significant advance for its understanding. 
Using a very large sample, it is confirmed that momentum risk is too high (21.68% 
annual average) and variable over time (8.58% annual change in standard deviation). 
Moreover, it is verified that the specific component of the strategy’s risk is by far the 
main responsible for these two findings, accounting for almost 95% of it, on average. 
The existing relations between total and specific-risk provided evidence that the main 
driver of momentum risk is the covariance that exists between the companies that are 
included in the strategy, explaining almost 98% of its magnitude, on average. This 
covariance comes from the individual characteristics of these stocks rather than from 
the common market component. Moreover, it is the volatility of the covariance 
component over time that explains most of the time-varying behaviour of momentum 
total risk. Nonetheless, while it is clear that the high risk comes from the covariance 
between residuals of stocks that are in the same decile (either winners or losers); the 
source of the time-varying effect is not so obvious, with the covariance among winners 
and between deciles taking the lead. 
The sub period analysis allowed extracting three periods that are critical in terms of 
momentum risk for its magnitude and volatility: 1975, 2000 and 2008. The existence of 
spikes during these three periods for covariances and correlations, with a stronger effect 
of the long side, supports the conclusion that they these components are crucial during 
the crash periods in the sample examined. 
This project also concluded that the effect of the relations between stocks is formed ex 
ante and actually moves in the opposite direction after the holding period. These 
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findings discard a behavioural explanation and indicate that the relation present may 
come from the individual characteristics that already existed. Moreover, part of the risk 
magnitude comes from a size and book-to-market effects, as drawn from the 
comparison of results using CAPM and Fama-French based residuals. 
The results of this work have important implications on the approach to momentum risk 
and may be used as a base point for further research on the specific sources of 
correlations in order to properly hedge it. 
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 Max Min Mean Std Kurt Skew SR 
RMRF 16,05 -23,14 7,05 15,03 1,98 -0,57 0,47 
SMB 22,06 -16,62 2,31 10,08 6,44 0,58 0,23 
HML 13,88 -12,87 4,62 9,68 3,08 0,14 0,48 
Momentum WML 29,98 -63,35 9,70 21,68 20,34 -2,35 0,45 
 
Table 1: Long-run performance of momentum against the Fama-French factors, from 
January 1951 until December 2010. ‘Max’ and ‘Min’ are the maximum and minimum 
one-month returns, respectively. ‘Mean’ and ‘Std’ are the annualized average and 
standard deviation of each portfolio, respectively. These four statistics are in 




          
σ Mean Std Kurt Skew 
Average 
Weight 
Momentum Risk 18,91 8,58 6,78 2,81  
Market Component 3,17 2,76 2,16 1,72 5.77% 
Specific Component 18,44 8,56 6,91 2,84 94.23% 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the decomposition of momentum risk. The first row is 
for momentum realized standard deviation calculated each year based on the previous 
60 months. The second and third are for its market and specific components. The last 










               
σ Max Min Mean Std Kurt Skew 
Average 
Weights 
Specific Risk 1,86 0,08 18,44 8,56 6,91 2,84  
Var 0,02 0,00 2,89 0,52 -0,07 0,66 2.18% 
Cov WW 1,24 0,01 12,41 5,83 15,95 3,38 67.81% 
Cov LL 0,71 0,01 10,90 4,18 10,48 2,85 58.57% 
Cov WW_LL 0,40 -0,31 6,18 6,18 1,90 1,01 -28.57% 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the decomposition of momentum specific-risk. The 
first row is for total specific risk, the second for the variance component and the last 
three for the covariance among winners, losers and between them, respectively. The last 
column indicates the average weight of each component on strategy-specific risk. The 
other statistics are the same as in previous tables. The discrepancy between the sum of 
components and the total specific risk (calculated from the difference between total risk 





              
Average Max Min Mean Std P-value %Positive 
WW 5y CAPM 26,84 3,63 10,37 4,57 0.0000 100% 
LL 5y CAPM 20,46 4,05 9,81 2,89 0.0000 100% 
WW_LL 5y CAPM 11,55 -9,65 0,62 2,90 0.0000 57,73% 
WW 5y FF 12,55 2,23 5,57 1,74 0.0000 100% 
LL 5y FF 14,29 2,54 5,43 1,66 0.0000 100% 
WW_LL 5y FF 0,49 -8,12 -3,49 1,49 0.0000 0,15% 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the average correlation of residuals, from January 
1956 until December 2010. The first three rows regard CAPM and the last three FF 
residuals. All correlations are ex ante for winners, losers and across them, respectively. 
‘P-value’ bellow 0.05 indicates that the correlations are statistically different from zero 
for a one-tailed test with significance level of 5%. ‘%Positive’ is the percentage of 





            
1y-5y Max Min Mean P-value Positive 
WW CAPM 9,18 -25,22 -5,20 -29,69 10,03% 
LL CAPM 24,25 -12,24 -1,46 -6,77 29,48% 
WW_LL CAPM 18,18 -7,93 3,09 19,71 84,10% 
WW FF 3,49 -11,97 -3,70 -44,90 4,78% 
LL FF 8,09 -8,28 -2,18 -23,30 15,28% 
WW_LL FF 15,75 -0,91 3,54 45,05 97,99% 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of the differences in correlations one year ahead and five 








Figure 1: Comparative performance of the long-run cumulative returns of momentum 
and the Fama-French factors. 
 






















Figure 3: Decomposition of Momentum Total Risk on the components of Specific Risk 
over time. 





















































Figure 4: Comparison between the correlations of residuals based on CAPM and 
Fama-French. The three graphs on the left are for the correlations using CAPM among 
winners, among losers and between them, respectively. The three graphs on the left are 
for the same correlations but using Fama-French. 
 
 
Figure 5: Comparison between the volatility of correlations over time. The order of the 
graphs is the same as in the previous figure. 






















































































Figure 6: Differences over time between ex post and ex ante correlations among 
winners, among losers and between the two. 
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